Some Key Aspects of the 1982 Draft Constitution (4)).
But what is the principal contradiction in China now? Again, the " Resolution " is helpful: it is " that between the growing material and cultural needs of the people and the backwardness of social production " (para. 35 (1)). The CPC has come to recognize that failure to make the strategic shift from class struggle to " socialist modernization centering on economic construction " was its past mistake, and now pledges never to deviate from this central task, i.e. economic construction.
Who then are the targets of this " people's democratic dictatorship "? Not the intellectuals, Peng Zhen said specifically. In the political conditions of today, the targets are " spies and special agents as well as old and new counter-revolutionaries," and those who commit " serious criminal activities such as embezzlement, bribery, smuggling, selling smuggled goods, speculation, cheating and stealing public property."9 Beyond these categories, elements singled-out in Zhao Ziyang's Report on the Restructuring of the State Council, 2 March 1982 -those who rose by making themselves out to be " rebels " and following after Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, people whose thinking is seriously affected by factionalism, trouble-makers who hit, smash and loot, and those who have committed serious political or economic offences in the past few years'? -may also be considered " targets of dictatorship," in practice if not in official definitions.
Similarly, individuals and groups found guilty of " ideas that deviate from the Party's correct principles, . . factionalism, . . . anarchism and ultra-individualism and . . . such unhealthy tendencies as the practice of seeking perks and privileges,"" may find life difficult in the years to come.
There are critics on the right who contend that " dictatorship " and constitutionalism are incompatible.12 Unless the notion of " dictatorship " is abandoned altogether, it is a mockery to be speaking of constitutional rule, they say. Be that as it may, I think one cannot simply forego the choice between two less than ideal options in the face of China's realities. As constitutional provisions go, the simple " democratic republic of, for and by the people "13 or " people's democratic state " would be preferable by convention. But " people's democratic dictatorship " is still more agreeable than " dictatorship of the proletariat." The China Quarterly
Economic Revisionism
That the 1982 Draft has embraced economic revisionism is, for its authors, something not readily admitted but hard to deny. In spite of the new emphasis in Article 1, paragraph 2 that the socialist system is the country's basic system which is not to be disrupted, several other articles in Chapter One spell out these revisionist features.
As does its 1978 predecessor, the 1982 Draft Constitution will protect the working people's right to farm plots of agricultural and hilly land, engage in household sideline production and keep livestock for their own needs (Art. 9), and the right of citizens to own lawfully-earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property (Art. 14). In this regard, the 1978 proviso " that the absolute predominance of the collective economy of the people's commune is ensured " (Art. 7, 1978) has been dropped. Instead, a new article protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy which is declared " a complement to the socialist sector of the economy owned by the public " (Art. 11). The right of inheriting private property protected under the 1954 Constitution but dropped in 1975 and 1978 is revived (Art. 15).
In addition to state planning, there is now a direct and clear reference to the desirability of balancing economic plans with market regulation " as a subsidiary " (Art. 17). The need to rely more on " expert " and expertise (as opposed to " red " elements) is endorsed (Art. 16). Other moderate features, discussed often in the last few years, such as democratic management in a collective economy, worker participation in enterprise management, the powers of independent economic decisionmaking of both state enterprises and collective economies are constitutionally recognized (Arts. 18, 19). The high-sounding but problematic general line of " going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results," which survive all the years since 1958 and was retained in 1978 (Art. 11, 1978) is gone; it is replaced by an emphasis on " proportionate and co-ordinated development " (Art. 17). Similarly, the principle of self-reliance is relegated to the background, and various roles to be played by " foreign enterprises, other foreign economic organizations or foreign individuals " in China's quest for economic development are given appropriate recognition, together with an emphasis on respect for law by all parties (Art. 12).
In these provisions about China's economy, one sees, more than in other selections, the retroactive mentality and the transitional nature of this 1982 Draft. The contents of these provisions aim to deal with the ills and the needs of China's economy as seen in the years between 1976 and 1982 rather than what the decades ahead may require.14 Together, they do not really amount to a coherent statement of a socialist economic philosophy. The search is still going on, it seems. A sympathetic, bold interpretation may well be that a collective leadership based on law, i.e. the management of state affairs by the consensus of a four-man team presumably with the support of the CPC chairman, is being created. This is conceivable if we accept the possible development of a collective leadership within the CPC and the interlocking of Party-state directorate. Such an idea has been advocated by the CPC for some time and is taken by many as an arrangement to extend beyond the Deng helmsmanship.
Looking at it this way, the Draft Constitution makes some sense. The CMC chairman's power is limited to leading the armed forces and nothing else; on non-military matters, he is expected to defer to the premier. The premier is clearly more than a house-keeper as he actually runs the first line executive and administrative machinery of the state day-in and day-out, giving substance to government as well as Party policies. The chairman of the NPC standing committee is clearly a post whose influence can hardly be underestimated, as will be seen in the next section. As to the weaker chairman of the state, he shall rank first by protocol, enjoy personal prestige and privileges. Under certain conditions, his high position within the Party combined with his power to nominate the premier can also be significant politically.
In short, there is a balance of sorts among these power-sharing bodies built into the design of the 1982 Draft. Taken together with the application of the system of decision by the Premier (Art. 86), and by the CMC chairman (Art. 95), the limitation of terms of office in all four posts (Arts, 64, 79, 87, 96), the campaigns against personality cult since 1978, and the history of a long drawn-out debate over the state chairmanship between 1959 and 1982, the case for a " collective leadership based on law " interpretation is not without foundation.
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Relaxation of certain doctrinaire principles
To suggest that a sign for collective leadership may be in the picture does not mean that the system will necessarily become more democratic. For the principle of collective leadership is juxtaposed with other principles such as democratic (proletarian) dictatorship, democratic centralism, and the integration of legislative and executive functions.
The principles of democratic (proletarian) dictatorship and democratic centralism, in Mao's terms, serve as the correct means of handling contradictions between the people and the enemy and contradictions among the people respectively. History has shown, however, that contradictions among the people were frequently and arbitrarily turned into contradictions between the people and the enemy, especially during the periods in which the Left radicals took charge. The principle of democratic centralism is also applied as an organizational guideline in the state institutions (Art. 3). However, we have also seen how the democratic aspects operate once in a long while at best, but the centralist aspects dominate the routine procedures at practically all levels of the government. These principles have no doubt contributed to the expansion of arbitrary power of the executive, administrative organs over the last three decades. 16 The system of integrating legislative and executive functions comes from the assertion that sovereignty belongs to the people and is indivisible, and from the experience of proletarian dictatorship in the 1871 Paris Commune.'7 In China, all state power is vested in the NPC and the NPC in turn delegates this power to its standing committee, to the State Council (and other central organs) and to the local governments in the fashion of descending pyramidal steps. Under this system, all organis of the state are considered to be simultaneously legislative as well as executive. At its extreme, it is argued that there is no room for a government bureaucracy that is separate and parallel to the elected representative body. Montesquieu's separation of powers and its corollary checks and balances are dismissed in a doctrinaire manner as Capitalist propaganda.'8 Predictably, such a utopian approach to government and politics only plays into the hands of power manipulators, especially the strategic-minded leaders of organized revolutionary parties. The NPC in China cannot be said to have functioned well in reality; it has been ignored for long periods of time The China Quarterly and when convened, it is at best a legitimizing rubber stamp and a transmission belt.
To be sure, these principles are involved and controversial doctrines of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought that cannot be dealt with in this essay with justice. Suffice it to say that, in the experiences of the Soviet Union and the PRC, they have only led to the development of bulky, corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies rather than efficient, balanced and productive systems of administration and management.
Perhaps the recognition of these points is a factor in Beijing's recent reforms. PRC scholars have been writing that the separation of three powers in the west may have merits after all and may be worthy of selective emulation.19 Peng Zhen actually said " the rational division of powers of state " in the Draft is " more reasonable and clear " this time.20 The message is to strengthen the state machinery by making it a sounder, more realistic and accountable system, and giving it the detailed attention it deserves. If all goes well, the NPC will still be supreme but the NPC standing committee will be taken more seriously as a routinely functioning body. The State Council will have clearer roles and will become simultaneously more responsive and more responsible. So will be the roles of law and the judicial and procuratorial organs. And the local governments too will re-emerge from the shadow of the Party committees and the muddled people's communes and play their parts as they should.
In short, the doctrinaire principles will be relaxed in the interest of better politics, better economics and for the sake of China's modernization. Reference to the CPC in the Draft Constitution is now limited to the Preamble. Direct interference in government affairs by the Party will be, by the Draft Constitution, no longer permitted, or at least, no longer encouraged.
Redefinition of the supremacy of the NPC and its Standing Committee
There is little question that the 1982 Draft Constitution is an improvement where the state machinery is concerned. Organizationally, the State Council will have as its members the premier, the vice-premiers, the ministers, the chairmen of commissions (as in the 1978 version), and additionally, the secretary-general, the chief auditor, and " commissioners of state." This last category has been created, probably, to accommodate, in the short-run, the " former vicepremiers " forced to relinquish their posts in the recent streamlining operation, and to develop, in the longer-run, an inner cabinet of the State Council in the interest of efficiency. This is seen in the formal institution of a " regular meeting " attended by the premier, vicepremiers, commissioners of state and the secretary-general, so that the plenary meeting " need not be called frequently (Art. 88). Also of significance are the application of " the system of decision by the premier " (Art. 86), and the limitation of his terms of office (Art. 87). If the premier was merely " the first among equals " before,22 Article 86 now changes that fundamentally. It is to be noted that the official English translation seems to emphasize the power of decisionmaking, while the Chinese version stresses the responsibility side. Power and responsibility are indeed the two sides of this new coin, whose use promises greater efficiency. Whether this system of decision by the premier is compatible with the principle of democratic centralism, we have yet to find out; the Draft Constitution apparently does not consider it a problem. As to limiting the terms of office, it is a long-overdue correction. It promises the services of younger, more dynamic personnel for the key posts. The establishment of an independent auditing body is yet another indication that constitutionalism may be given a chance and that the finance of the government departments and enterprises will be supervised and audited in accordance with provisions of the law (Art. 92).
The air is there. one senses that the State Council is being given clearer roles and being fitted with leaner, hopefully more agile, machinery and Some Key Aspects of the 1982 Draft Constitution equipment so as to carry out more successfully the formidable tasks of modernizing the nation. There must be expectations of more systematized planning and execution of economic and social development, more legalist work procedures, and a much-increased work load to justify all these efforts and changes.
It can be no accident that the NPC standing committee approved Premier Zhao Ziyang's reports on the extensive restructuring of the State Council and the Draft Constitution at the same time. The streamlining of the State Council can be likened to difficult surgery by a team of poorly equipped but determined doctors on a giant patient suffering from chronic diseases and devastating previous surgeries. Its purpose is to remove blockages in the digestion/circulation systems and to cut away remnants of potentially threatening malignant growths. The Draft Constitution, in turn, can be compared to a solemn pledge by that patient whose health will be greatly improved if he can abide by the contents of that pledge. Both are difficult but good for China.
Greater autonomy for local governments
Below the central apparatus, the strengthening of the state machinery at the local levels of government can also be seen. The Draft has dropped the system of " integrating government administration with commune management," reinstated the people's congresses and people's governments in rural townships, and redefined the people's communes as collective economic organizations (Arts. 98, 9). The neighbourhood committes and villagers' committees are written into the Constitution as mass organizations of self-government (Art. 113). Grass-roots level government should now have clearer lines of duty to facilitate services to the masses. Local people's congresses of and above the county level will establish standing committees so as to carry on the work of the congresses on a more permanent basis (Art. 106). They are given the right to " formulate and promulgate local statutes " so as to meet the uneven needs and demands of various places (Art. 103). Since China " is a big country and every province has a population of tens of millions or even 100 million, equal to that of a big or medium-sized country," it is high time that the Constitution affirms this right and gives play to local initiatives.23 The enlargement of the power of self-government in the autonomous regions of various national minorities (Arts. 116-124) is likewise to be lauded.
Some citizens'Rights and Duties, perhaps
It has been pointed out frequently that the protection of human rights in Communist countries is a mockery and a false promise. On paper, the Constitutional provisions are impressive; in practice, the record is 
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It might also be mentioned that there is some propaganda (Art. 41, para. 3) which would be better left out of a Constitution.
There are, of course, positive improvements in this Chapter also. First, the principle that " All citizens are equal before the law " is reinstated (Art. 32).
Secondly, there is careful and detailed attention to personal freedom (Art. 36) and personal dignity (Art. 37), thanks to some adverse personal experiences of the leaders during the Cultural Revolution.
Thirdly, citizens' right to make criticisms of and proposals, reports, appeals, or complaints to any organ of state have been given more detailed protection (Art. 40). This is apparently aimed at the rampant bureaucratism and corruption.
Fourthly, the system of retirement is now written into the Draft (Art. 43).
Fifthly, the protection of Chinese residents abroad has been extended to cover returned overseas Chinese and the relatives of Chinese residents abroad living in China (Art. 47).
On balance, this Draft is probably more realistic, if not more liberal. Some brief comments on the independence of the judiciary are desirable here. Article 128 has re-established that " People's courts shall exercise judicial authority independently according to provisions of the law and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, organizations or individuals." One must note that it is the court, not the individual judge, who enjoy this independence, and keep in mind also that interference from the Party is not within the purview of this article. The same is true for the people's procuratorates (Art. 133).
United Front, Yes; Unification, Later
Still another aspect of the 1982 Draft has to be treated, if only cursorily, before we conclude this discussion. That is the efforts to entice concerned parties in and out of mainland China into a national united front.
A more reasonable united front strategy is visible in the Preamble in several ways. To begin with, Dr Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary record are given credit. Next, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, wherein the token minor parties and overseas Chinese have some roles to play, is written into the Constitution formally. The word " revolutionary " is left out when the united front is mentioned. Taiwan is not to be " liberated " any more; it is now a matter of accomplishing "the great task of reunifying the motherland " with the co-operation of "our compatriots in Taiwan."
Of particular significance is Article 30 which states: " The state may, where necessary, establish special administrative regions. The rules and regulations in force in special administrative regions shall be stipulated by law according to specific conditions." Clearly, this is in reference to Taiwan, and possibly to Hong Kong and Macao. Deng Xiaoping has on occasion spoken of the unification of (not unification with) Taiwan as
